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The accurate measurement of the level of consciousness of a creature remains a major scienti¯c
challenge, nevertheless a number of new accounts that attempt to address this problem have
been proposed recently. In this paper we analyze the principles of these new measures of con-
sciousness along with other classical approaches focusing on their applicability to Machine
Consciousness (MC). Furthermore, we propose a set of requirements of what we think a suitable
measure for MC should be, discussing the associated theoretical and practical issues. Using the
proposed requirements as a framework for the design of an integrative measure of consciousness,
we explore the possibility of designing such a measure in the context of current state of the art in
consciousness studies.
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1. Introduction
Having suitable tools for comparative analysis and evaluation is a key factor for the
progress of any new scienti¯c research. Speci¯cally, in young and emerging ¯elds, like
the case of MC research, the availability of these sorts of tools is essential. As pointed
out by [Seth et al., 2008], the use of such measuring tools could not only help us to
assess the progress actually being achieved, but also to indicate what the most
promising research lines are. Although a number of authors have proposed di®erent
approaches, de¯ning accurate metrics for assessing the level of consciousness of either
biological organisms or arti¯cial implementations remains an open problem. One of
the main di±culties is related to the characterization of the term consciousness,
which can be described from di®erent perspectives. For instance, from the point of
view of phenomenology [Carruthers, 2000], consciousness could be measured in terms
of the degree of the vividness of conscious experiences. However, from the point of
view of access [Baars, 2002], consciousness could be measured in terms of the contents
of the mind available for explicit processing. Additionally, the fact that di®erent
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theories try to account for consciousness using di®erent (and to a certain extent
incompatible) views [Atkinson et al., 2000], leads to the de¯nition of measures that
are only valid in the context of the speci¯c theory they support. Although current
theories propose totally di®erent explanations for the production of phenomenal
consciousness, we think there are many common denominators about other aspects of
consciousness across major theories, and this could help us to de¯ne interim measures
characterized by the current common agreement of what early MC implementations
are expected to be. In other words, the main question we analyze in this paper is: can
we identify a minimum consensus reached in the scienti¯c study of consciousness that
could be pragmatically used to de¯ne an (interim) integrative and mostly agreed
measure suitable for MC implementations?
It is important to note that an a±rmative answer to the former question does not
imply in any way that such a measure would be a complete one. Fully satisfactory
measures will be possible only when a ¯nal \grand uni¯ed theory of consciousness" is
developed. Nevertheless, we think that adopting this approach can contribute to a
reiterative rede¯nition of better measures that incrementally integrate current sci-
enti¯c insight about consciousness. This exercise will in turn help to evaluate the
validity of the hypotheses being considered in the measuring process, thus providing
valuable feedback to the quest for a scienti¯c explanation of consciousness. For
instance, if according to particular measure there exist cases in which high con-
sciousness scores are assigned to MC implementations that do not practically show
the expected conscious behavior, the underlying hypotheses would need to be revised.
Essentially, we suggest that, in the speci¯c ¯eld of MC, more e®ort should be put into
the development of measures oriented to the \easy problems" of consciousness
[Chalmers, 1995], rather than focusing exclusively in the application of di®erent
speculative measures related to the \hard problem" [Chalmers, 1995]. We believe
that, adopting an evolutionary inspired approach and extrapolating it to the
development of arti¯cial conscious machines, the so-called easy problems of con-
sciousness have to be solved in the ¯rst place in order to be in a better position to
e®ectively study the hard problem in arti¯cial cognitive systems. Indeed, the current
idea of the hard problem could change drastically when all easy problems are solved
[Dennett, 1996]. Although phenomenal states can be present in humans in the
absence of directly associated behavioral outcome (for instance, during dreaming or
daydreaming), the early development of consciousness is rooted in a direct and
adaptive interaction of the body with the environment [Humphrey, 1999].
Phenomenal states without associated adaptive behaviors do not make any sense
unless the subject is endowed with cognitive capabilities in the ¯rst place. Conse-
quently, assuming that analogous developmental principles apply to MC [Arrabales
et al., 2009], a strategy directed to the design of machines able to develop phenomenal
states without solving ¯rst the easy problem does not seem to be a promising
approach. Therefore, the e®ort in the development of measures of consciousness
suitable for MC should be initially more focused on the assessment of the cognitive
194 R. Arrabales, A. Ledezma & A. Sanchis
2
capabilities associated with consciousness. Whether or not the development of such
measures can also contribute to the detection of phenomenal states in machines
remain to be seen. The development of MC implementations able to deal with the
easy problems will likely shed light on how arti¯cial qualia could be produced, and
therefore provides new insights about how phenomenal states can exist in machines.
This feedback could be used then to de¯ne better integrative measures that also
consider the generation of phenomenal states in the machine. Adopting this position
does not mean that only cognitive measures should be developed now, neglecting
phenomenal approaches to consciousness. What we claim is that measures of
phenomenal consciousness alone, without considering the cognitive dimension, seem
not to be of practical application in the short term. Considering the hypothesis that
phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness will develop together in MC
implementations, as seemed to happen in biological organisms, a measure integrating
both aspects would be much more signi¯cant.
In the following we identify the main requirements of a suitable measure for MC
discussing the associated problems; then we brie°y review the most salient accounts
proposed as measures of consciousness, analyzing the issues related with their
potential practical use in the ¯eld of MC.
2. Designing a Machine Consciousness Measure
Setting aside the discussion about what theories of consciousness are closer to the
reality and whether or not they can also be applied to MC, at this point we should
identify practical issues that need to be addressed about the theories and the
application of associated measures. In this section we aim to characterize the
measures of consciousness that could be considered in the domain of MC and we
review the practical requirements that a compelling measure for MC should ful¯ll.
2.1. Measuring consciousness
Before analyzing the speci¯c requirements for a MC suitable measure, it is important
to consider the main factors involved in the problem of measuring consciousness as
typically applied to humans. First of all, a distinction should be made between the
concepts of testing for the presence of consciousness versus measuring the level of
consciousness. Although considering consciousness as an on/o® property can be of
practical use in some every day contexts, a rigorous scienti¯c account must be pur-
sued in order to e®ectively determine a fairly accurate level of consciousness of either
biological organisms or arti¯cial systems. This graduation of consciousness could be
applied both to creature consciousness and to state consciousness [Manson, 2000]. In
other words, the overall level of consciousness of a subject could be assessed in terms
of the particular level of consciousness of the mental states he or she possesses.
Therefore, a creature not having any conscious mental states at all is considered
completely unconscious.
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In addition to the level of consciousness of a given mental state, the related explicit
content being consciously perceived could also be assessed. Indeed, the explicit
content also determines the functionality of consciousness [Seth, 2007]. Along the
lines of the argumentation discussed in the introduction section, the cognitive abil-
ities of an agent determine the speci¯c mental content that will be available to
conscious states. In terms of the Global Workspace Theory (GWT) the conscious
contents would be those gaining access to the working memory, right under the
spotlight of attention [Baars, 1988]. The higher the degree of richness and elaboration
of these conscious contents is, the higher the potential functionality of the associated
conscious experience will be. Multimodality is also a typical feature of conscious
experience, i.e., di®erent sensory modalities, like hearing, seeing, and smelling are
bound together giving place to an integrated percept. Understanding how di®erent
sensory modalities are uni¯ed in conscious scenes is known as the binding problem
[Revonsuo and Newman, 1999]. The binding capacity of an arti¯cial mind could also
be assessed.
Another important aspect to take into account in the de¯nition of a measure of
consciousness is the required multidimensionality. Consciousness is a \cluster" or
composed property [Sloman, 2002; Block, 1995], and it cannot be measured the same
way as simple properties like distance or mass using single well-de¯ned units (e.g.,
meters or kilograms). A comprehensive measure of consciousness has to take into
consideration a set of capabilities and qualities supported by the system and assess
howwell they are integrated. One example of themultiple facets that can be associated
with consciousness is the list of cognitive skills proposed in the scale ConsScale
[Arrabales et al., in press]. Obviously, a single score could be calculated as an indicator
of the level of integration between di®erent capabilities. Nevertheless, this indicator
alone would not provide a su±cient characterization of the level of consciousness.
A scienti¯c measure of consciousness has to be, of necessity, a third person
approach; however, consciousness is inherently a ¯rst person phenomenon. Therefore,
approaches exclusively based on behavior assessment can only be considered as an
indirect source of evidence of consciousness. In the domain of MC we believe that the
¯rst person problem can be circumvented by combining ¯rst and third person
approaches as suggested by [Dennett, 1991]. In general, the combination of beha-
vioral and non-behavioral (e.g., dynamical complexity [Seth et al., 2008]) measures is
required to fully characterize the level of consciousness of a subject.
An additional strategy for the detection of consciousness is the identi¯cation of
correlates or hallmarks. A number of properties have been appointed as hallmarks of
consciousness [Arrabales et al., in press; Edelman et al., 2005; Seth et al., 2005],
however they characterize speci¯c levels of consciousness (like accurate verbal report
which is characteristic of human-level consciousness) or speci¯c underlying mech-
anisms for consciousness (like neuroanatomical properties of mammalian nervous
systems). If these hallmarks are to be used in an evaluation process they have to be
arranged in speci¯c levels [Arrabales et al., in press].
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2.2. Requirements of a suitable measure for machine consciousness
In the former section we have identi¯ed several facts about consciousness that should
be taken into account in the design of a comprehensive measure:
. F1. Consciousness is a graded property (a continuum rather than a binary
property).
. F2. A creature is conscious in virtue of its conscious mental states.
. F3. Conscious mental content determines the functionality of consciousness.
. F4. Conscious content is multimodal, integrated, and di®erentiated.
. F5. Consciousness is a complex multidimensional property.
. F6. Scienti¯c study of consciousness calls for the combination of ¯rst and third
person approaches.
. F7. Di®erent hallmarks of consciousness can be associated with di®erent levels of
consciousness and di®erent species or machines.
Although this list of facts is not comprehensive, neither free of controversy, we think
it reasonably describes the explananda of any theory of consciousness as identi¯ed by
a signi¯cant part of the scienti¯c community, e.g., see [Seth et al., 2008; Manson,
2000; Sloman, 2002; Dennett, 1991; Edelman et al., 2005; Dennett, 1997]. Therefore
all these aspects of consciousness should be addressed by an integrative measure
applicable to MC. Clearly, some of the former claims are still important sources of
controversy, and even the completeness of the list is doubtful. However, we believe
that, in order to be practical from the engineering perspective, adopting such a
somewhat reductionist position in the domain of MC would be helpful, at least until
signi¯cant results are obtained that force a revision of the active research lines (either
modifying existing claims or adding new ones).
In addition to the former considerations, evaluating arti¯cial systems implies
further requirements about design, procedures, and applicability:
. R1. The measure should be applicable to any MC implementation, independently
of the underlying substrate and technology used in the arti¯cial organism.
. R2. The measure should be problem domain independent; i.e., applicable to any
MC implementation independently of its application domain.
. R3. The measure should be computable in a reasonable time using currently
available computational power.
. R4. The measure should provide qualitative and quantitative characterization of
the level of consciousness of the arti¯cial organism (i.e., able to assess graded
consciousness).
. R5. The measure should provide a multidimensional characterization of the
consciousness level of the subject. Given the complex nature of consciousness,
a single aggregated score would not be enough to characterize the level of
consciousness of a MC implementation (scores exclusively aimed at, for
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instance, assessing the vividness of conscious scenes, or self-consciousness, or
Theory of Mind [Vygotsky, 1980] abilities would be incomplete).
. R6. The measure should not rely exclusively on behavioral criteria (third person),
inner machinery should also be inspected for architecture-based and infor-
mation processing criteria (this will also prevent conscious-like pre-programed
behaviors to fool the measure).
Taking into consideration these requirements we can review existing measures of
consciousness and analyze what accounts are closer to meet them all, and why some
requirements are not yet ful¯lled.
3. Existing Measures of Consciousness and their Application
to Machine Consciousness
A detailed review of measures of consciousness is out of the scope of this paper, for a
comprehensive review and discussion of measures see [Seth et al., 2008]. In this section
we will focus exclusively on the applicability of the most salient measures of con-
sciousness in the domain of MC. We will use the requirements de¯ned above to eva-
luate the applicability of these measures to machine consciousness implementations.
Clinical diagnosis of disorders of consciousness in humans is usually based on
neuro-behavioral criteria [Schnakers et al., 2009]. Related behavioral measures, like
the Glasgow Coma Scale [Jennett, 2002] or the more recent JFK Coma Recovery
Scale-Revised [Giacino et al., 2004], do not meet requirements R1 and R2 because
these measures are speci¯cally designed for humans. Given the limitations of these
behavioral scales [Giacino et al., in press], even when applied to humans, neuro-
imaging techniques are being appointed as complementary diagnostic tools [Laureys
et al., 2004]. However, according to R1, all measures exclusively based on mammalian
nervous system, or more speci¯cally, on human brain are not suitable for MC
(although they could be of some validity for those MC implementations based on
arti¯cial neural systems matching the complexity of the brain). Therefore, all neuro-
physiological markers and measures like bispectral index [Rosow and Manberg, 2001],
Event-related Cortical Potentials (ERP) [Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2003], neuronal
synchrony [Singer and Gray, 1995; Vanderwolf, 2000], etc., are not of direct appli-
cation to MC. Nevertheless, although these clinical procedures cannot be directly
applied to MC, the strategy of combining behavioral assessment methods with inner
inspection (like neuro-imaging) can be extrapolated to the ¯eld of MC along the lines
speci¯ed in requirement R6. In fact, behaviors associated with consciousness rep-
resent indirect evidence, and it is di±cult to di®erentiate between re°exive and
intentional behavior. Therefore, combining behavioral assessment and inner inspec-
tion seems to be a good strategy. Discussing speci¯c strategies about inner inspection
in MC implementations would be a complete paper on its own, some approaches have
been proposed, like looking for software or hardware architectural hallmarks
[Sloman, 2002; Arrabales et al., in press], calculating the capability of information
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integration of the system [Tononi, 2004; Koch and Tononi, 2008], or looking for the
presence of axiomatic properties [Aleksander and Dunmall, 2003].
Given the obvious limitation of clinical diagnosis behavioral scales in their
applicability to MC, other behavioral approaches can be explored in order to be
combined with inner inspection. One common problem with classical behavioral
approaches, like the Turing test [Turing, 1950], is that conditions to pass the test are
too strong, and indeed only applicable to human-level consciousness. In other words,
the Turing test does not comply with requirement R4 (neither with R5 and R6), not
being suitable for measuring di®erent aspects or lower levels of consciousness. As in
the Turing test, accurate verbal report is usually applied to assess consciousness in
humans. However, this criterion is too strong for machine or animal consciousness.
Nevertheless, reportability of mental contents with grounded meaning is a sign of
consciousness [Haikonen, 2007], and simpler forms of mental content report could be
used in machines. This will imply a rede¯nition of ¯rst person approaches adapted to
MC, with the aim to ful¯ll the requirements speci¯ed above. In general, incrementally
demanding and content-speci¯c behavioral tests have to be designed in order to ful¯ll
requirements R4 and R5. ConsScale is an attempt to meet these requirements,
however it is a scale focused on the functionality of cognitive abilities associated with
consciousness, and does not provide an account for the phenomenal dimension
[Arrabales et al., in press].
In terms of the Information Integration Theory of consciousness [Tononi, 2004],
information integration is an indicator of the level of phenomenal consciousness. In
relation with this account, the measures of dynamical complexity [Seth, 2009] are not
based exclusively in the notion of integration (unity of conscious experience), but in
the combination of integration and di®erentiation (ability to discriminate conscious
experiences amongst a vast repertoire of possible scenes). Note that in the context of
dynamical complexity the concepts of integration and di®erentiation refer to the
informational value of conscious scenes. While these measures that assess the balance
between integration and di®erentiation provide a characterization of the information
complexity in the system, behavioral tests provide an indication of the e®ective
functionality derived from the cognitive capabilities of the subject. As pointed out
above, if complexity and functionality are to develop together in MC implemen-
tations (although highly complex implementations without useful functionality are
possible), a suitable measure should combine these two accounts.
4. Conclusions
In this proposal we have tried to de¯ne a practical framework for the problem of
measuring consciousness in machines. Although the approach is, of necessity,
incomplete, we believe it is practical in terms of applicability and enhancement. A
practical and scienti¯cally plausible measure for MC should integrate all the aspects
discussed above. Taking just one aspect of consciousness as a canonical reference for
the assessment of the level of consciousness of arti¯cial systems would constitute a
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partial and biased evaluation. The complexity and multidimensional characteriz-
ation of consciousness cannot be neglected in the design of a good measure for MC.
The design of a comprehensive measure of machine consciousness calls for the inte-
gration of ¯rst and third person approaches, behavioral and non-behavioral
measures, phenomenal and access aspects. Measuring consciousness using a single
one-dimensional measure is too reductionist. A good comparative analysis of MC
implementations requires R5 to be ful¯lled; as each implementation might have
di®erent strengths in di®erent aspects of consciousness.
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